If someone could please set me straight for my own ongoing training (and while spoken of in another aligned posting on RRS standard of proof), as follows:
- it was established before, that: for rule 69, uniquely, we have 'comfortable staisfaction' and for all other rules we have 'balance of probabilities' ("(unless an applicable rule requires otherwise)").
- However, I now see that in 18.2 (e) it uses the term 'reasonable doubt' (being of course a higher standard again than the aforementioned standards).
Is this correct?
This is the start of Answer 1. There is much more in the case.
Answer 1
‘Comfortable satisfaction’ is one of three standards of proof commonly used in
courts of law or arbitration hearings. The other two standards are ‘proof beyond
a reasonable doubt’ and ‘balance of probabilities’. The ‘proof beyond a
reasonable doubt’ standard is the strictest of the three standards. It is usually
reserved for serious criminal cases. The ‘balance of probabilities’ standard (also
sometimes referred to as the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard) is the
least strict of the three, and it is widely used in civil legal proceedings.
...
I got the impression with comfortable satisfaction, that say for a warning it may be quite easy to be so satisfied, but for an event disqualification, a lot more evidence would be required.
Reasonable doubt, is hopefully well understood.
I think there is a distinction which the wording hides.
The burden of proof looks at the facts found, and then decides the outcome based on those facts.
The 18 qualification, gives you a means to find a fact (overlap or not) when you have a reasonable doubt about the fact.
Balance of probability as standard of proof is “more likely than not” - 50.5% to 49.5%.
The classic test for “beyond reasonable doubt” is “possible, but not in the least probable.” Now more often phrased as “certain”, but I’d stick with the classic one as being more easily understood.
“Comfortable satisfaction” isn’t clearly defined. It’s between the two. I’d suggest it’s where you are not finely weighing the odds, as in balance of probabilities, but not quite at “Not in the real world” of beyond reasonable doubt.
The classic situation in a hearing is that there is no clear evidence that an overlap was established or broken. One was of resolving this is to establish the last point of certainty ( generally when both parties agree on the relative positions of their boats). On occasions this may be which boat passed the last mark ahead!
Having established the last point of certainty, as there is no evidence that this situation has changed, then 18.2(e) allows us to apply this situation to resolving the incident.
I say so for the following reasons: a doubt based on reason and common sense - and, implicitly, on evidence - may be any one of a doubt on the balance of probabilities, a doubt as to comfortable satisfaction, or a reasonable doubt. In each case, it is a doubt based on analysing the evidence as against the relevant standard of proof and, on reason and common sense, being satisfied it does not meet that standard.
By contrast, a doubt that is not based on reason, common sense or the evidence, but is instead based on speculation, is one that is irrational (which is occasionally phrased as being unreasonable). It is irrational and wrong no matter what the relevant standard standard of proof, because it is not based on a rational analysis of the evidence before the decision-maker as against the standard of proof.
Therefore: a doubt not based on reason, common sense or evidence = irrational doubt. A doubt that is reasonable to hold and not wholly improbably = reasonable doubt.
One of the ways I've occasionally explained this is that a decision-maker has the right to be wrong on the evidence, but not to be mad on no evidence. Making a mad decision when you don't have any evidence to base it on is irrationality.
To go then to your example in the hearing; there is no clear evidence that the overlap was broken, but there is evidence. There is not clear evidence to make a finding either way, therefore it does not meet the relevant standards of proof. One reverts to the last point of certainty - and remember, "certain" is another phrasing for "beyond reasonable doubt" - as being the last point at which one can be satisfied to the standard of proof on the evidence.
If, however, one were to assume without evidence that matters had changed in a specific way after the last point of certainty, that would be ignoring the evidence and proceeding on speculation. It would then be an irrational decision.
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